Throughout history, only violent and catastrophic events have significantly cut inequality by Scheidel, Walter
By Democratic Audit UK 2017-3-22
Throughout history, only violent and catastrophic events
have significantly cut inequality
democraticaudit.com /2017/03/22/throughout-history-only-violent-and-catastrophic-events-have-significantly-
cut-inequality/
Are mass violence and catastrophes the only forces that can seriously decrease economic inequality? To judge by
thousands of years of history, the answer is yes, argues Walter Scheidel in this extract from his new book, The
Great Leveller: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the 21st Century. Over
thousands of years, only violent events have significantly lessened inequality. The “Four Horsemen” of levelling —
mass-mobilisation warfare, transformative revolutions, state collapse, and catastrophic plagues—have repeatedly
destroyed the fortunes of the rich.
Detail of a miniature of deaths from famine by Jean de Wavrin, between 1471-83. Image taken from f. 187 of
Anciennes et nouvelles chroniques d’Angleterre, volume 1. British Library. Public domain
For thousands of years, civilisation did not lend itself to peaceful equalisation. Across a wide range of societies and
different levels of development, stability favoured economic inequality. This was as true of Pharaonic Egypt as it
was of Victorian England, as true of the Roman Empire as of the United States. Violent shocks were of paramount
importance in disrupting the established order, in compressing the distribution of income and wealth, in narrowing
the gap between rich and poor. Throughout recorded history, the most powerful levelling invariably resulted from the
most powerful shocks. Four different kinds of violent ruptures have flattened inequality: mass mobilisation warfare,
transformative revolution, state failure, and lethal pandemics. I call these the Four Horsemen of Levelling. Just like
their biblical counterparts, they went forth to “take peace from the earth” and “kill with sword, and with hunger, and
with death, and with the beasts of the earth.” Sometimes acting individually and sometimes in concert with one
another, they produced outcomes that to contemporaries often seemed nothing short of apocalyptic. Hundreds of
millions perished in their wake. And by the time the dust had settled, the gap between the haves and the have-nots
had shrunk, sometimes dramatically.
Only specific types of violence have consistently forced down inequality. Most wars did not have any systematic
effect on the distribution of resources: although archaic forms of conflict that thrived on conquest and plunder were
likely to enrich victorious elites and impoverish those on the losing side, less clear-cut endings failed to have
predictable consequences. For war to level disparities in income and wealth, it needed to penetrate society as a
whole, to mobilise people and resources on a scale that was often only feasible in modern nation-states. This
explains why the two world wars were among the greatest levellers in history. The physical destruction wrought by
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industrial-scale warfare, confiscatory taxation, government intervention in the economy, inflation, disruption to global
flows of goods and capital, and other factors all combined to  wipe out elites’ wealth and redistribute resources. They
also served as a uniquely powerful catalyst for equalising policy change, providing powerful impetus to franchise
extensions, unionisation, and the expansion of the welfare state. The shocks of the world wars led to what is known
as the “Great Compression,” massive attenuation of inequalities in income and wealth across developed countries.
Mostly concentrated in the period from 1914 to 1945, it generally took several more decades fully to run its course.
Earlier mass mobilisation warfare had lacked similar pervasive repercussions. The wars of the Napoleonic era or the
American Civil War had produced mixed distributional outcomes, and the farther we go back in time, the less
pertinent evidence there is. The ancient Greek city-state culture, represented by Athens and Sparta, arguably
provides us with earliest examples of how intense popular military mobilisation and egalitarian institutions helped
constrain material inequality, albeit with mixed success.
The world wars spawned the second major levelling force, transformative revolution. Internal conflicts have not
normally reduced inequality: peasant revolts and urban risings were common in premodern history but usually failed,
and civil war in developing countries tends to render the income distribution more unequal rather than less. Violent
societal restructuring needs to be exceptionally intense if it is to reconfigure access to material resources. Similarly
to equalising mass mobilisation warfare, this was primarily a phenomenon of the twentieth century. Communists
who expropriated, redistributed, and then often collectivised levelled inequality on a dramatic scale. The most
transformative of these revolutions were accompanied by extraordinary violence, in the end matching the world wars
in terms of body count and human misery. Far less bloody ruptures such as the French Revolution levelled on a
correspondingly smaller scale.
Violence might destroy states altogether. State failure or systems collapse used to be a particularly reliable means of
levelling. For most of history, the rich were positioned either at or near the top of the political power hierarchy or were
connected to those who were. Moreover, states provided a measure of protection, however modest by modern
standards, for economic activity beyond the subsistence level. When states unravelled, these positions,
connections, and protections came under pressure or were altogether lost. Although everybody might suffer when
states unraveled, the rich simply had much more to lose: declining or collapsing elite income and wealth compressed
the overall distribution of resources. This has happened for as long as there have been states. The earliest known
examples reach back 4,000 years to the end of Old Kingdom Egypt and the Akkadian empire in Mesopotamia. Even
today, the experience of Somalia suggests that this once potent equalising force has not completely disappeared.
State failure takes the principle of levelling by violent means to its logical extremes: instead of achieving
redistribution and rebalancing by reforming and restructuring existing polities, it wipes the slate clean in a more
comprehensive manner. The first three horsemen represent different stages, not in the sense that they are likely to
appear in sequence—whereas the biggest revolutions were triggered by the biggest wars, state collapse does not
normally require similarly strong pressures—but in terms of intensity. What they all have in common is that they rely
on violence to remake the distribution of income and wealth alongside the political and social order.
Human-caused violence has long had competition. In the past, plague, smallpox, and measles ravaged whole
continents more forcefully than even the largest armies or most fervent revolutionaries could hope to do. In agrarian
societies, the loss of a sizeable share of the population to microbes, sometimes a third or even more, made labor
scarce and raised its price relative to that of fixed assets and other nonhuman capital, which generally remained
intact. As a result, workers gained and landlords and employers lost as real wages rose and rents fell. Institutions
mediated the scale of these shifts: elites commonly attempted to preserve existing arrangements through fiat and
force but often failed to hold equalising market forces in check.
Pandemics complete the quartet of horsemen of violent levelling. But were there also other, more peaceful
mechanisms of lowering inequality? If we think of levelling on a large scale, the answer must be no. Across the full
sweep of history, every single one of the major compressions of material inequality we can observe in the record
was driven by one or more of these four levellers. Moreover, mass wars and revolutions did not merely act on those
2/3
societies that were directly involved in these events: the world wars and exposure to communist challengers also
influenced economic conditions, social expectations, and policymaking among bystanders. These ripple effects
further broadened the effects of levelling rooted in violent conflict. This makes it difficult to disentangle developments
after 1945 in much of the world from the preceding shocks and their continuing reverberations. Although falling
income inequality in Latin America in the early 2000s might be the most promising candidate for nonviolent
equalisation, this trend has remained relatively modest in scope, and its sustainability is uncertain.
Other factors have a mixed record. From antiquity to the present, land reform has tended to reduce inequality most
when associated with violence or the threat of violence—and least when not. Macroeconomic crises have only short-
lived effects on the distribution of income and wealth. Democracy does not of itself mitigate inequality. Although the
interplay of education and technological change undoubtedly influences dispersion of incomes, returns on education
and skills have historically proven highly sensitive to violent shocks. Finally, there is no compelling empirical
evidence to support the view that modern economic development, as such, narrows inequalities. There is no
repertoire of benign means of compression that has ever achieved results that are even remotely comparable to
those produced by the Four Horsemen.
Yet shocks abate. When states failed, others sooner or later took their place. Demographic contractions were
reversed after plagues subsided, and renewed population growth gradually returned the balance of labor and capital
to previous levels. The world wars were relatively short, and their aftereffects have faded over time: top tax rates
and union density are down, globalisation is up, communism is gone, the Cold War is over, and the risk of World War
III has receded. All of this makes the recent resurgence of inequality easier to understand. The traditional violent
levellers currently lie dormant and are unlikely to return in the foreseeable future. No similarly potent alternative
mechanisms of equalisation have emerged.
Even in the most progressive advanced economies, redistribution and education are already unable fully to absorb
the pressure of widening income inequality before taxes and transfers. Lower-hanging fruits beckon in developing
countries, but fiscal constraints remain strong. There does not seem to be an easy way to vote, regulate, or teach
our way to significantly greater equality. From a global historical perspective, this should not come as a surprise. So
far as we can tell, environments that were free from major violent shocks and their broader repercussions hardly
ever witnessed major compressions of inequality. Will the future be different?
Excerpted from The Great Leveller: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First
Century by Walter Schiedel. Copyright © 2017 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission.
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